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Negative self-views have proved to be a consistent marker of vulnerability for
depression. However, recent research has shown that a particular kind of cognitive
conflict, implicative dilemma, is highly prevalent in depression. In this study, the relevance
of these conflicts is assessed as compared to the cognitive model of depression
of a negative view of the self. In so doing, 161 patients with major depression and
110 controls were assessed to explore negative self-construing (self-ideal discrepancy)
and conflicts (implicative dilemmas), as well as severity of symptoms. Results showed
specificity for the clinical group indicating a pattern of mixed positive and negative
self-descriptions with a high rate of conflict. Regression analysis lent support to the
conflict hypothesis in relation to clinically relevant indicators such as symptom severity,
global functioning. However, self-ideal discrepancy was a stronger predictor of group
membership. The findings showed the relevance of cognitive conflicts to compliment
the well-consolidated theory of negative self-views. Clinical implications for designing
interventions are discussed.
Keywords: cognitive conflicts, implicative dilemmas, major depression, self-ideal discrepancy, self-esteem,
cognitive therapy, constructivist therapy, repertory grid technique
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive models describe depression as involving pervasive negative views of the self, the world
and the future generated and maintained by deficits and biases in information processing (e.g.,
Beck et al., 1979; Ingram et al., 1998). These negative beliefs are thought to be rooted in a negative
self-schema which gives rise to negative thoughts that depressed patients experience in everyday
life. This theory has received extensive empirical support by a large body of research concerning its
core tenets, especially in relation to the pattern of low self-esteem and negative self-constructions
as a marker of vulnerability for depression (e.g., Orth et al., 2009; Zeigler-Hill, 2011; Sowislo and
Orth, 2013). However, as Beck recently acknowledged (Beck, 2002; Beck and Dozois, 2011), the
cognitive model needs further developments and extensions. One of the main limitations of the
model is that it is focused almost exclusively on patient’s negative patterns of thinking, whereas
perceived positive self-attributes and, particularly, the relation between positive and negative self-
constructions remains virtually unexplored.
In this article, we build on existing support for the relevance of implicative dilemmas (IDs), a
type of cognitive conflict in which negative self-views (e.g., symptoms) are associated to positive
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aspects of the patients’ identity (see below for a detailed
description). A series of studies found that IDs are significantly
more prevalent in depressive participants than in controls and
that they are also associated with the severity of patients’ clinical
status (Feixas et al., 2014a,b; Montesano et al., 2014). Based on
these results, we sought to improve our understanding of the role
of these internal conflicts on the cognitive system of depressed
individuals, by testing out their relevance against the classical
cognitive formulation of a negative view of the self.
There are several signs indicating that the classical formulation
of low self-esteem and negative self-view in depression should
be extended. On the one hand, Baumeister et al. (2003) pointed
out in their sound review about self-esteem that although almost
every study did show that people with low self-esteem displayed
higher levels of depression than people high in self-esteem, the
relationship between low self-esteem and depression may conceal
some influence of other variables. In addition, these authors
concluded that it is far from clear that interventions aimed at
boosting self-esteem are sufficient to promote positive outcomes
in different contexts such as school or job performance, or
interpersonal relationships.
On the other hand, although many studies have examined the
content of the self-views, only a few researchers have attempted to
explore their organization or structure, which is believed to be as
relevant as the content itself for the maintenance of a depressive
self-schema (Ingram et al., 1998). Furthermore, only few attempts
have been carried out to study positive self-attributes of depressed
individuals. In these studies, we can find some evidence showing
that the self-system of depressed individuals is not devoid of
positive content. It differs from controls in the way in which
such content is organized (e.g., Space and Cromwell, 1980).
Dozois and Dobson (2001a,b) found that clinically depressed
patients showed significantly greater organization for negative
content while the structure of positive self-defining content
had fewer interconnections. However, although they studied
the interconnectedness separately for positive and negative self-
relevant adjectives they did not explore the interconnections
between positive and negative self-perceptions neither the
possible conflict among them.
A growing body of literature about intrapersonal conflict,
nonetheless, has yielded promising support for its role in mental
health and motivational processes (Lauterbach, 1996; Grawe,
2004; Mansell, 2005; Carey, 2008; Feixas et al., 2014b; Montesano
et al., 2014). Distressing effects of inner conflicts have been
observed to be influencing the onset and maintenance of a variety
of psychological disorders (see Michalak et al., 2011, for a review)
as well as to be associated with subjective well being and life
satisfaction (Palys and Little, 1983; Little et al., 2007). Emmons
and colleagues have shown that goal conflicts might generate
motivational deficits, behavior inhibition, and difficulties in
action control (Emmons and King, 1988; Emmons et al., 1993).
As for depression, motive-goal discrepancies and inconsistencies
between attitudes have been associated with higher levels of
depressive symptoms beliefs (Renner and Leibetseder, 2000;
Stangier et al., 2007; Püschel et al., 2011).
Despite this preliminary evidence, the role of internal
conflicts in depression is yet an underresearched topic within
contemporary psychotherapy and clinical psychology. More
research is needed in order to clarify to what extent cognitive
conflicts might play a role in the cognitive system of depressed
individuals. Tracking internal conflicts is nevertheless a difficult
task given their implicit nature. The relative lack of research
might be due to the fact that there are not many available
methods for assessing internal conflicts in clinical settings. In the
last decade, Feixas and colleagues developed a procedure for a
tailored assessment of internal conflicts, the so-called IDs (Feixas
and Cornejo, 2002; Feixas et al., 2009).
Implicative Dilemmas as a Way to Tap
Internal Conflicts
The notion of ID draws from personal construct theory (Kelly,
1955/1991) and defines a particular type of conflict between
two opposing parts of the self, two personal constructs. In
personal construct theory, the cognitive system is conceived as an
evolving network of bipolar personal constructs (e.g., optimistic–
pessimistic) which are hierarchically interconnected. This system
comprises the specific subjective way in which individuals
construe their selves and the ongoing experience. However, the
network of personal constructs might not necessarily reflect a
logically structured cognitive system but, rather, it may comprise
inconsistencies and conflicts, such as IDs.
An ID is a conflict in which a desired change (e.g., becoming
happier) simultaneously implies an unwished change on a core
aspect of a client’s identity (e.g., to stop being good person
and become bad person). This implication (e.g., associating
being happier with becoming worse person) is based on an
implicit association between the two personal constructs. The net
aftermath of the clash between these two opposing forces often
results in a vacillation that could paralyze clients from achieving
their desired changes (e.g., symptom improvement). To further
illustrate the notion of IDs, we have represented graphically its
components in Figure 1. Basically, there are three main elements
involved in and ID:
1. Discrepant constructs refer to the need for change.
They are self-representations in which a person perceives
a meaningful discrepancy between the present self and
the ideal self. This type of personal construct represents
perceived negative attributes, which typically indicate areas
of malaise and symptoms in which a change from one pole
to the opposite pole of the construct is desired. In Figure 1,
the present self is in the pole, “depressed,” and the ideal self is
in the pole, “happy.”
2. Congruent constructs refer to the need for continuity and
personal coherence. They are constructs in which the self and
the ideal self are close to each other, allocated to the same pole
of the construct (e.g., good person), and therefore the person
perceives congruency between the present self and the ideal
self. These are mostly core constructs that are connected to
personal values, beliefs, and attitudes that define the central
sense of an individual’s identity (Montesano et al., 2009,
2014); therefore, a person would resist changing to avoid
self-invalidation. In the example, both the actual self and the
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ideal self of the participant are regarded as “good person” as
opposed to “bad person.”
3. An association between these two constructs within a
patient’s personal construct system in such way that the
desired change implies an unwished change, as in the
example in which “becoming happier,” in turn, implies
“becoming worse person.”
An ID, therefore, is detected whenever there is an association
between the desired pole of a discrepant construct and the
undesired pole of a congruent construct so that, in the example,
being happy implies becoming a bad person. Because of that
implication, this cognitive structure reflects a dilemma for the
person. To put into words, “if I feel happy I risk becoming a bad
person but by remaining a good person will be depressed.”
Research conducted so far on IDs has shown that they
are significantly more prevalent in clinical samples than in
controls (OR = 3.43; Montesano et al., 2015) and especially
in depression. Specifically, researchers reported percentages of
68.3% of patients with a diagnosis of major depression (Feixas
et al., 2014a) and 69.6% in a sample with dysthymia (Montesano
et al., 2014) in contrast to roughly a third of non-clinical
individuals. In addition, depressed patients tended to show
a much higher number of IDs, to the extent of tripling the
number in control groups. Furthermore, depressive patients
with IDs presented lower levels of global functioning and
more frequent history of suicide attempts and moderate to
high correlations have been found between symptom level and
number of IDs (e.g., Feixas et al., 2014b). All these findings
lend support to the cognitive conflict hypothesis indicating that
depressed people often present an underlying conflictual self-
schema represented by an interconnection between positive and
negative self-constructions (congruent and discrepant constructs,
respectively). Accordingly, it seems that, at least for a large
number of patients, it is not only negative self-perceptions,
but also the conflict with positive aspects of the self, the
mechanism that maintains depressive symptoms. In this study,
we bring into comparison the classical cognitive theory about
depression linked to low self-esteem with the cognitive conflict
hypothesis, weighing the ability of the later to complement the
former.
As in Beck’s cognitive model, the cognitive conflict hypothesis
also considers that negative views of the self do, certainly, have a
disheartening influence in depressed patients. But in our view, the
main problem for changing these negative views is that often they
are connected in a conflictual way with other positive views which
are more central to the sense of identity in that they involve core
self-constructions. In depressive patients, congruent constructs
mostly concern self-perceived moral qualities (such as “sensitive,”
“cares for others,” “good person”; see Montesano et al., 2014).
Therefore, the opposite poles of these core constructs are really
undesirable for these patients who try to avoid movement toward
those poles (e.g., “insensitive,” “selfish,” “bad person”). In sum,
desirable changes in patients’ negative views of the self (e.g.,
movement of the self from “sad” to “happy,” or from being a
“worthless” to a “valuable person”), are linked in the cognitive
system to undesirable changes on congruent constructs (e.g., self
moving from a “good” to a “bad” person).
This approach recognizes not only the need to change (turning
negative views into positive ones) but also the need to preserve
core identity values and, more important, to avoid changing in
an undesired direction. The conflict between these two needs
might better explain the difficulties depressive patients have in
developing more fully positive views of themselves, and also the
FIGURE 1 | Structure of an implicative dilemma.
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difficulties therapists encounter in changing the negative views of
their patients. These cognitive conflicts might also be responsible
for the high rates of relapse because once negative views become
more positive, these newly acquired positive views of the self can
be sensed as inappropriate because of their implicit linkage with
the undesired poles of the congruent constructs.
Research Questions of the Study
As said, a recent well-controlled study (Feixas et al., 2014a) found
promising evidence for the relevance of IDs indicating differences
between depressed and non-depressed participants regarding
prevalence of subjects with conflicts (ϕ = 0.33) and individual
frequency of conflicts (d = 0.67). However, the role of negative
self-views of depressed participant’s was not taken into account
in the analysis. Arguably, the higher intensity and prevalence
of IDs found may respond to increased negativity of depressed
participants’ self-constructions. Conversely, the cognitive conflict
hypothesis asserts that IDs are not an epiphenomenon of the
low self-esteem but rather a particular self schema which plays a
noticeable role in the cognitive system of depressive participants.
Thus, the main objective of this study was to compare the
cognitive conflict hypothesis with the classical formulation of
negative views of the self by performing a reanalysis of Feixas and
colleagues data set. In so doing, we used data derived from the
repertory grid technique (RGT; see Materials and Methods) to
contrast both variables: presence of IDs as a measure of conflict
versus self-ideal discrepancy as a measure of self-negativity.
Concretely, in this study, we explored the following research
questions: (a) Which is the predominant self-construing pattern
in depressive participants as compared to controls, positive,
negative, mixed, or conflictual? (b) Are cognitive conflicts a
stronger predictor than negative self-views of clinically relevant
measures such as level of symptoms and global functioning? (c)
Are cognitive conflicts a stronger predictor of the presence of the
disorder than negative self-views?
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Data was collected from two separate groups. A depressive
sample was recruited from several health care centers of the
city of Barcelona (Spain) and its surrounding area. From the
233 patients who were referred to the study, a first meeting
was arranged with 186 participants (the remaining 47 declined
to participate or were untraceable). Nineteen of those patients
were excluded because they did not meet criteria and six refused
further participation in the study. The final sample consisted of
161 patients (78.3% females) meeting the following criteria: (a)
18–65 years of age, (b) diagnostic criteria for major depression
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000), and (c) a score
of 20 or more on the Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition
(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). Exclusion criteria were (a) presence of
bipolar, schizophrenia, or schizoaffective disorder, (b) presence of
psychotic symptoms, (c) current substance abuse, and (d) organic
mental disorder, brain dysfunction, or pervasive developmental
delay.
The second group was composed of 110 participants (71.8%
females) serving as controls and meeting the inclusion criteria
of: (a) 18–65 years of age, (b) scoring less than 14 on the BDI-
II (to ensure the absence of significant depressive symptoms),
and (c) no presence of psychiatric or neurological illness.
Participants of both groups meeting the inclusion criteria
and willing to participate gave written informed consent on
forms approved by local research ethics committees. After the
recruitment period, the comparability of both groups was tested
out. Participants’ demographic and baseline characteristics are
presented in Table 1. As shown, no significant differences were
found in regard to sex, age, marital status, and education level.
On the other hand, as expected, both groups differed significantly
in level of symptoms.
Instruments and Measures
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I
Disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1996)
The SCID-I is a semi-structured interview which includes an
introductory overview and nine modules designed to assess
categorically defined DSM-IV-TR Axis I psychiatric disorders.
Lobbestael et al. (2011) reported adequate test–retest reliability
for major depressive disorder in clinical samples (K = 0.66). The
output of the SCID-I was recorded for each depressed participant
as the presence or absence of major depression disorder and the
level of global functioning (GAF).
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1996)
The BDI-II is a well-consolidated 21-item multiple-choice self-
report questionnaire for assessing depressive symptom severity
in clinical samples but also in general population samples. In our
study, It was used to assess participants’ symptom severity and as
a criterion of inclusion in both samples to control the symptom
level within each group.
Repertory Grid Technique (Feixas and Cornejo, 2002)
The RGT is a constructivist assessment procedure which stems
from Kelly’s (1955/1991) personal construct theory and was
further developed by multiple researchers from a wide range
of disciplines, although chiefly used in clinical studies (Saúl
et al., 2012). The main strength of the RGT is that it allows
an individually tailored elicitation of personal constructs. We
used a paper–pencil version of the RGT which involved three
different stages. First, the interviewer elicited the elements
(present self, ideal self, and significant others identified by the
participant) which were written to designate the columns of the
grid. Secondly, personal constructs were elicited by presenting
the participants with dyads of elements and asking them to
identify any personally relevant way (avoiding physical attributes)
in which both elements were viewed as similar and different
to each other (e.g., both are “cheerful”). For each response, an
opposite construct pole was also elicited (e.g., “cheerful versus
gloomy”). Elicitation of constructs ended when each participant
reached their saturation point. Responses anchored the two ends
of a bipolar construct for which, in the third stage, participants
were asked to rate all of the elements across each of the elicited
constructs using a 7-point Likert scale. The resulting grid was
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TABLE 1 | Demographic and baseline characteristics of depressed patients and non-clinical participants.
Depression (n = 161) Control (n = 110) p-Value
Sex (female:male) 126:35 79:31 0.29
Age (M; SD) 47.13; 11.31 44.51; 14.39 0.11
Married/living together (Fr; %) 93; 57.8 71; 64.5 0.32
Years of education (M; SD) 11.9; 2.4 12.2; 3.8 <0.001
BDI-II (M; SD) 36.06; 9.81 5.28; 4.36 <0.001
M, mean; SD, standard deviation; Fr, frequency; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition.
composed of personal constructs (rows) and elements (columns)
which provided a matrix of ratings for each participant. From that
grid data matrix several indices of self-construing can be obtained
using GRIDCOR software (Feixas and Cornejo, 2002). For the
purpose of exploring the research questions of our study, the
RGT stands out as very convenient instrument because it includes
among its measures both, negative self-views and cognitive
conflicts. Specifically, the following measures and indexes were
used:
1. Self-ideal discrepancy. This index was used as a measure
of negative self-construing, computed by the Pearson
correlations between ratings of the elements “actual self ” and
“ideal self.” High positive correlations are usually interpreted
as high self-esteem (Feixas and Cornejo, 2002). Research
on the correlation between self-ideal discrepancy measured
with the RGT and other global self-esteem measures such
as Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale has yielded coefficients
ranging from 0.67 to 0.84, indicating that, although they are
not the same, both measures are substantially related to each
other (e.g., Arnold, 1988; Leach et al., 2001; Watson and
Watts, 2001).
Although this measure may differ from other standardized
traditional measures of self-negativity, it has one specific
advantage: it focuses on participants’ subjective self-views.
In consonance with a personal construct point of view, the
valence of the self-descriptions’ content is not defined a priori
by the researcher or by external observers, but from the
participants themselves as showed by their ratings to the
ideal self in each construct of their grids. Therefore, the self-
ideal discrepancy index indicates areas of dissatisfaction as
perceived by the participants themselves. This measure is
in line with other methods that rely on a tailored semantic
space model of cognition highlighting the role of self-
ideal discrepancy in the regulation of depressive mood and
the maintenance of negative self-schemas (Higgins, 1987;
Dozois and Dobson, 2001a,b). Previous studies have already
considered self-discrepancy, as measured by the RGT, as an
index of negative self-construing in depression (Feixas et al.,
2008), and other disorders such as fibromyalgia (Compañ
et al., 2011), or eating disorders (Dada et al., 2012).
2. Type of construct. Based on the rating given to the self
and the ideal self two kind of constructs can be identified: (a)
discrepant constructs, which are those in which the ratings
assigned to the element “present self ” and the element “ideal
self ” differ by four or more points within the 7-point scale,
and so they are allocated to opposite poles. They represent
areas of self-dissatisfaction associated to negative views of
the self, and (b) congruent constructs, in which there exists
a coincidence or a maximum of one point of discrepancy
between the “present self ” and the “ideal self ” elements and,
therefore, are allocated in the same pole of the construct.
Congruent constructs represent areas of self-satisfaction
often connected to personal values and beliefs.
Although congruent and discrepant constructs are part of
IDs they have never been used as measures for the specific
assessment of self-positivity and self-negativity, respectively.
We use them to explore between-group differences in
patterns of self-construing. This measure was not included
in the previous study by Feixas et al. (2014a).
3. Cognitive conflicts. This is a categorical variable indicting
presence or absence of conflict. As explained in the Section
“Introduction,” an IDs is composed by a combination of a
congruent construct and a discrepant construct. Specifically,
IDs are detected if the Pearson’s correlation between
the ratings to all elements of congruent and discrepant
constructs are equal to or higher than 0.35, so that the
desirable pole of the discrepant construct is associated with
the undesirable pole of the congruent construct (see Figure 1;
Feixas et al., 2009). The rationale for using a criterion of
0.35 is based on Cohen’s guidelines (Cohen, 1988) about the
interpretation of Pearson’s correlation strength.
Studies testing the reliability of patterns of construct
relationships tend to yield coefficients which fall within the range
of 0.60 to 0.80 (see Fransella et al., 2004 for a review). Feixas et al.
(1992) looked at the stability of the self-ideal discrepancy over
three time intervals obtaining reliability coefficients ranging from
0.78 to 0.94 (p < 0.001). Caputi and Keynes (2001) also found
considerable stability of the relationships between self and ideal
self, with coefficients ranging from 0.61 to 0.81.
Procedure
During a period of 3 years, GPs and mental health professionals
working in various public health services referred depressed
candidates to the study. For each patient, two independent and
specifically trained master-level students administered the above-
mentioned instruments in face-to-face interviews at the health
centers from which each patient was referred. The assessment
process consisted of two interviews of approximately 2 h. Especial
attention was paid to the outcome of the SCID-I and the BDI-
II to determine if patients met inclusion criteria during the first
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interview. If so, a second appointment was scheduled to complete
the RGT. Each pair of evaluators was supervised by a research
assistant before and after every assessment to ensure adequate
adherence to the study protocol.
Recruitment of control group participants was made through
two different channels. On the one hand, some agreements
were made between the research group and an array of civic
associations in order to obtain volunteers. In exchange, free
psycho-educational talks were offered for their participation in
the study. On the other hand, a call was made among graduate
and undergraduate students to refer non-clinical participants
(friends and relatives) for the study. Non-depressed participants
were also evaluated with the BDI-II to rule out likely non-
diagnosed depressive participants. Then, if necessary, a second
appointment was scheduled to complete the RGT assessment
process. Participants from both groups provided informed
consent at the first meeting.
Data collected from RGT was analyzed with the software
GRIDCOR v. 4.0 (Feixas and Cornejo, 2002) to obtain the self-
construing indices. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences
version 21 (IBM Corporation, Armonk, New York, United States)
was used for further regression analyses.
RESULTS
Which is the Predominant
Self-Construing Pattern in Depressive
Participants?
In order to determine which kind of self-construing pattern
prevailed in both samples, a Chi-squared test was performed to
compare four different conditions: (a) participants presenting
only congruent constructs, (b) only discrepant constructs, (c)
both congruent and discrepant constructs without IDs, and
(d) at least one ID (see Table 2). While the clinical sample
presented significantly more participants with IDs, there were
more participants presenting only congruent constructs in
the control group [χ2 (3, N = 271) = 65.91; p < 0.001]
with a large effect size (Cramer’s V = −0.33). A noteworthy
outcome is that only two participants (1.2%) from the clinical
sample (none of the controls) showed a grid configuration
with only discrepant constructs (see Table 2), meaning that
a completely negative self-construing pattern was very rare.
A significant difference was also found [t(305.5) = 5.80,
p < 0.001; d = 0.66] indicating more congruent (M = 8.20,
SD = 4.80) than discrepant constructs (M = 5.38, SD = 3.85)
within the clinical sample, that is, more positive than negative
self-constructions.
Are Cognitive Conflicts a Stronger
Predictor than Negative Self-Construing
of Clinically Relevant Measures?
A series of regression analyses were performed to assess the
capacity of IDs versus self-ideal discrepancy to predict levels
of symptoms (BDI-II), and global functioning (GAF). The
correlations between actual and ideal self were transformed into
Fisher’s z scores for the regression analyses. Preliminary analyses
were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions
of normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity.
First, standard multiple regression was used to estimate the
potential of the variables (self-ideal discrepancy and presence of
conflict) to predict levels of BDI-II. The total variance explained
by the model as a whole was 35% (R2), F(2,268) = 73.09,
p < 0.001. Both variables were statistically significant, with
self-ideal discrepancy recording a higher β value (β = −0.53,
p < 0.001) than presence of conflict (β = 0.13, p = 0.013).
A second standard multiple regression was performed to predict
levels of GAF within the clinical sample. The model as a whole
explained 9% of the variance, F(2,158) = 7.58, p < 0.001, with
both predictors making a statistically significant and similar
contribution (conflict β = 0.19, p < 0.05; self-ideal discrepancy
β= 0.21, p< 0.05).
Are Cognitive Conflicts a Stronger
Predictor of the Presence of the Disorder
than Negative Self-Views?
A logistic regression was performed to assess the predictive
capacity of self-ideal discrepancy and presence of IDs on the
likelihood of belonging to the clinical sample. The full model
was statistically significant with no interaction effects, χ2 (2,
N = 271) = 103.61; p < 0.001, and explained between 31.8%
(Cox and Snell R2) and 43% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance,
correctly classifying 76% of cases. As shown in Table 3, both self-
ideal discrepancy and presence of IDs made a unique statistically
significant contribution to the model. The strongest predictor was
self-ideal discrepancy, recording an odds ratio of 0.4.
A receiver operating characteristic curve was constructed to
test the accuracy of the logistic regression model for predicting
group membership (see Figure 2). The area under the curve
equaled 0.85 (SE = 0.02, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.80–0.89),
indicating that the regression model was accurate, and prediction
was significantly different from random assignment. Fixing the
cutoff point at 0.54 and, thus, maximizing the false positive to
false negative ratio, the model showed 80.7% sensitivity and
73.8% specificity.
DISCUSSION
This study appraised the relative importance of positive and
negative self-representations and their conflictive organization in
participants with a major depressive disorder. The overarching
hypothesis was that cognitive conflicts would better explain the
personal constructions of depressive patients than negative self-
views. In order to do so, we first explored the patterns of self-
construing in a sample of major depressive patients as compared
to a non-depressed group and then evaluated their capacity to
predict several clinical indicators.
With regard to the valence of self-constructions, we found
that 93.8% of the clinical participants showed a mixed pattern
of positive and negative self-perceptions, 5% presented with
exclusively congruent constructs in their grids, and only two
participants (1.2%) had a “pure” self-negative pattern. These
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TABLE 2 | Comparison between samples in type of self-construing pattern.
Only congruent Only discrepant Both but no dilemmas Implicative dilemmas
Depression Fr (%) 8 (5) 2 (1) 41 (25.5) 110 (68.3)
Sr −8.0∗ 1.2 1.0 5.5∗
Control Fr (%) 50 (45.5) – 22 (20) 38 (34.5)
Sr 8.0∗ −1.2 −1.0 −5.5∗
Fr, frequency; Sr, adjusted standardized residuals. ∗Sr > ± 1.96.
TABLE 3 | Results of the logistic regression predicting belonging to the depression or control groups.
B SE Wald df Significance Odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio
Lower Upper
Presence of IDs 0.78 0.31 6.28 1 0.021 2.18 1.18 4.02
Self-ideal discrepancy −3.32 0.47 50.07 1 0.000 0.04 0.01 0.09
Constant 0.89 0.29 9.55 1 0.002 2.43
FIGURE 2 | Receiver operating curve to test regression model accuracy.
results are in line with the literature showing that the self-system
of depressed individuals is not devoid of positive content. Indeed,
clinical participants of our study displayed significantly more
positive constructions of the self (congruent constructs). It seems
that the most prevalent pattern is a mixture of positive and
negative self-views. However, results also indicated that up to the
73% of depressed participants with mixed patterns presented with
conflictual configurations in their cognitive-system. In contrast to
controls, there was a large effect size in the presence of conflicts,
being this the most salient between-groups difference.
With regard to the ability of conflicts to predict several
clinical indicators, results were mixed. When the variables
(self-ideal discrepancy and presence of conflict) were entered
in the model for predicting level of depressive symptoms,
self-ideal discrepancy was the best predictor. The inverse
relationship between self-esteem and depression has been
extensively validated (see Silvia and Eddington, 2012; Sowislo
and Orth, 2013) whereas the nature of the relationship between
the presence of conflict and symptoms still remains unclear.
Although some studies found high correlations (Montesano et al.,
2014), most have reported a medium correlation coefficient,
suggesting that the relationship between these variables may not
be linear. Despite this result did not confirm our prediction, it
was not totally a surprising finding that self-ideal discrepancy
was most predictive of symptom severity. However, the presence
of IDs also uniquely contributed to the model. Thus, we may
contemplate number of IDs as a variable playing some secondary
role with respect to symptom severity.
The relevance of the conflict hypothesis was also tested out
by predicting the level of global functioning. In this case, both,
self-ideal discrepancy and conflict, made a similar contribution
to the model. The GAF entails a broader assessment of the
severity of the disorder than the BDI-II by taking into account
several indicators such as social, occupational and psychological
impairment (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000).
Although our results suggested that cognitive conflicts might
be associated to the functional limitations of depression, the
low percentage of total variance explained by the model (9%)
indicated that other mechanisms must be involved. Suffice it
to say that, for instance, employment status or physical pain
may have greater influence on GAF scores. The degree to which
complexity of clinical situations is somehow linked to a higher
frequency of dilemmas deserves the attention of further research.
An additional outcome supporting the cognitive conflict
hypothesis arose when generating a model for classifying
participants into clinical or control groups. R2 values indicated
that the model as a whole was able to explain a respectable
level of variance, and a receiving operating curve confirmed its
accuracy, yielding adequate levels of sensitivity and specificity
for predicting group membership. In the resultant equation, the
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presence of IDs emerged with less predictive power than self-
ideal discrepancy, but still made a unique significant contribution
to the model. It is important to note that IDs cannot be seen
as completely independent from self-ideal discrepancy insofar as
IDs require the presence of discrepant constructs for which there
is a substantial difference between self and ideal self. However,
the model indicated that even though it is true that negative self-
views were highly prevalent, IDs were not an epiphenomenon but
an independently relevant self-schema to understand the nature
of depressive patients’ cognitive system.
In sum, depressed participants in this study showed a mixed
pattern of positive and negative self-perceptions with a high
rate of conflict. When comparing the ability of the variables to
explain clinically relevant measures, self-ideal discrepancy was
a better predictor of the severity of symptoms, and presence
of the disorder but not of global functioning. Nevertheless,
both indices significantly contributed on each model. A global
evaluation of the results, therefore, led us to conclude that
cognitive conflicts were not better predictors for depression
than negative self-construing, but still they showed a certain
level of predictive power. Certainly, in the light of our results,
IDs might complement the well-established evidence for a
negative self-schema in depression by recognizing not only
the necessity to change negative self-constructions but the
need to conserve the coherence with positive self-defining
attributes.
This need to preserve self-coherence has also been highlighted
by other theories like self-verification (Swann, 2012) or
self-regulation (Vohs and Baumeister, 2011), as well as by
certain therapeutic models such as coherence therapy (Ecker
et al., 2012) or some systemic approaches (e.g., White,
2007). However, no operational procedures have been created
so far to detect implicit conflict configurations between
negative and positive self-constructions. Thus, the concept
of ID provides an innovative contribution not only for the
understanding of cognitive structures underlying pathological
processes but also for therapy interventions inasmuch as they
might be amenable of therapeutic work (see Feixas et al.,
2013).
A core strategy in cognitive therapy for depression consists
of identifying depressed patients’ negative self-representations,
and directly challenging patients’ beliefs about themselves (Beck
et al., 1979). However, the cognitive conflict hypothesis suggests
that such an intervention would increase its efficiency by taking
into account the possible positive attributes related to symptoms
and negative self-perceptions. In doing so, the intervention could
become more acceptable to patients and, thus, better help in
therapeutic adherence and in decreasing the chance of relapse
and symptom persistence. A central aspect of this strategy would
be to integrate the desired change with the global self-system and,
especially, the preservation of the sense of identity. Even though
cognitive therapy has been shown to be effective for recovery in
the treatment of depression (e.g., Beck and Dozois, 2011), relapse
and recurrence still continue to be a prickly challenge to deal
with. Further longitudinal research might explore the relevance
of cognitive conflicts to predict relapse and recurrence.
There are, nonetheless, some limitations that need to be
acknowledged and taken into account when looking at clinical
and theoretical implications of the results. First, the cross-
sectional design of the study precluded casual analysis of the
relationship between variables. Secondly, as inclusion criteria we
stablished BDI-II cut-offs for the clinical (above 19) and the
control (below 14) participants to avoid undiagnosed depression
in control participants and to ensure between-group differences
in depression scores. However, these criteria also affect the
generalizability of the results given that they exclude people
showing scores between 14 and 19 corresponding to mild levels
of depressive symptoms.
Finally, despite the evidence of the correlation between
standard measures of self-esteem and the self-ideal discrepancy, it
would be necessary to include in further research an explicit well-
established measure of self-esteem (e.g., Rosenberg) to increase
the generalizability of the findings. Ideally, given that self-
esteem is a complex construct that entails several dimensions,
the measurement of both implicit and explicit level of self-
esteem would allow measuring not only the level but also the
soundness and stability of participants’ self-esteem and so the
models tested out in the regression analyses would provide
more accurate outcomes. In this sense, another limitation of the
study is the absence of traditional standardized questionnaires
measuring self-negativity and other specific markers of cognitive
vulnerability to depression. Future studies should consider
combining the assessment of different levels of cognitive markers
such us self-schemata, dysfunctional attitudes, or automatic
thoughts to better depict the role of conflicts on the cognitive
system of depressed individuals. However, the assessment of self-
esteem by means of the RGT was both a limitation and an
advantage. Compared to traditional measures of self-esteem, the
RGT assesses the self-ideal discrepancy on the basis of meaningful
terms, their personal constructs, elicited by the participants
themselves.
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